Losing Confidence in the Command Selection Process

Losing Confidence in the Command Selection Process————-

                a commentary

                by J. F. Kelly, Jr.

 

Recently I wrote a column (“Incompetence in Command”) which expressed concern over the large numbers of Navy commanding officers (COs) being fired through an administrative process called detachment for cause. I should have chosen a different title. Anyone who is selected for command in what is a rigorous selection process is not likely to be incompetent. Usually a lapse in judgment, not incompetence, is the issue.

 

A senior officer in a commanding officer’s chain of command, usually the immediate senior in command (ISIC), may cause that officer to be relieved if he or she has lost confidence in the ability of that officer to successfully continue in command. The process is considered non-judicial but detachment for cause usually means the end of an officer’s career and amounts to being fired for performance or behavior issues that do not warrant trial by court-martial or other judicial procedures. Except in rare cases where a court-martial may be awarded or an officer is reinstated upon review and offered another command, there is usually no due process and the decision is both arbitrary and binding.

 

Since results usually determine whether or not a process is working, I suggested that the number of detachments for cause may be indicative of a flawed selection process that was producing too many failures. In addition to wasting a substantial investment in training officers for command, detachment for cause is disruptive to the crews involved and may be a disincentive to officers who might otherwise aspire to command. Among my recommendations was to modify the command selection process to put less weight on inflated performance reviews, career progression, and the recommendations of flag and senior officials not in the chain of command and more on the characteristics, traits and practices of successful COs, particularly in seagoing commands and especially in ships. I also suggested that highly successful commanding officers be retained in command for longer than the traditional tour length of one and one-half to two years and re-slated for multiple follow-on commands, even at the expense of overall command opportunity.

 

Longer command tours were the norm in the earlier days of nuclear powered ships and in some other navies. Adm. Hyman Rickover insisted on command tour lengths of up to four years or more to maximize the advantage derived from the additional experience. These officers were in command long enough to see the results of their efforts and take credit (or blame) for them. We should stop regarding command tours at sea primarily as stepping stones to promotion and focus more on building professionalism instead of careers by optimizing that unique experience gained in actually commanding a ship at sea.

 

The space constraints of an opinion column did not permit a more thorough treatment of the subject which is complex and has many ramifications. Perhaps it‘s time for a formal Navy study group to examine the command selection process and career progression in general.

 

 Commanding officers today require more than just competence. They must learn to survive in a near-zero tolerance environment. A single reported incidence of misbehavior or even the perception that they tolerate misbehavior anywhere in the command, which in earlier times might be overlooked, can result in detachment for cause. And it will be reported because everyone has a smart phone and almost nothing goes unnoticed.

 

Political correctness reigns in the Navy as well as in the rest of government and the civilian community. Anything which can be construed as favoritism, racism, insensitiveness, sexism, prejudice, etc., can precipitate detachment for cause. In fact, a mere accusation of sexual misbehavior may be enough.

 

While CO of a guided missile cruiser, I was an early advocate for woman serving in ships and later helped manage the initial integration of women into ships. It was anticipated, of course, that there would be fraternization problems but we perhaps underestimated the extent to which problems would occur in integrating young men and women into the crews of ships deployed for lengthy periods away from home. Suffice it to say that mixed gender crews clearly adds to the already considerable management challenges that today’s COs face.

 

In today’s politically correct, zero-tolerance environment, a CO has to be near perfect 24/7. But few humans are and in my times as CO, perhaps even fewer. It takes a rare leader to successfully command a naval warship today and when we identify those who do it consistently well, we should keep them in that role as long as feasible.

 

Malcolm Gladwell, in his best-selling book Outlier, discusses research that suggests that it takes about 10,000 hours of practice to become an expert in anything complex. Commanding a ship certainly qualifies as a complex assignment requiring expertise, especially commanding a modern navy warship. In addition to being a highly competent manager, motivating leader, seaman and ship-handler, he must be technically and tactically knowledgeable enough to maintain and operate sensors, weapons and other shipboard systems of immense complexity. In addition to these myriad other responsibilities however, he is at all times captain of a ship and crew which for civilian ship masters is a full time job for an entire career of perhaps 30 to 50 years. They, like commercial pilots, truly become expert at what they do. A Navy ship CO, on the other hand, with so many additional responsibilities, may spend, if he is fortunate enough to get two commands, a maximum of four years in command during a career of only 20 to 30 years which is hardly enough to acquire expertise, at least as Gladwell’s researchers defined it.

 

The point is, ship driving and commanding ships accounts for a very small portion of the average line officer’s career. Is this enough to create the required level of expertise and professionalism in a job that is substantially more complex than, say, flying a commercial aircraft or serving as master of a container ship? Perhaps the Navy is trying to train too many officers to command its ships and should focus on training fewer who will stay in command longer and be really good at it. Don’t our ships and crews, not to mention the taxpayers, deserve this?

 

October 30, 2014                                                                         

Truth in Campaign Advertising

Truth in Campaign Advertising—————————

                A commentary

                By J. F. Kelly, Jr.

 

Election time has been called the silly season for good reason. Prospective voters are bombarded with bombast extolling the incredible merits of a given candidate and the shocking failures and incompetence of his or her opponent. The quality of political discourse, seldom ever inspiring or enlightening, is at its very worst during political campaigns when candidates and their promoters move beyond excusable hyperbole into fantasy.

The candidates’ speeches can be bad enough but even politicians recognize certain limits beyond which lies the risk of backlash. Not so much the political action committees, campaign committees and the ad writers they hire. They recognize almost no boundaries and sometimes seem incapable of shame. Their sole objective is to get their candidate elected or their ballot measure approved/defeated. In politics as in war, it matters less how you play the game than whether or not you win. Winning is everything. This is the really unattractive side of politics and the reason many capable and decent people decline to run for office. Far too much effort is devoted to trying to destroy the opposition.

TV ads are by far the worst and the worst of these are the dramatizations wherein third rate actors portray what purports to be real people. The dialogue is usually simplistic and silly with the characters ultimately agreeing that one of the candidates is a dunce, if not inherently evil, and if elected, will surely push Granny over the cliff in her wheelchair, cause the earth to die and the oceans to rise. I have actually voted against candidates who approve such ads because they insult the intelligence of even the average voter. Fortunately, there is the mute button on the TV remote. What is truly unfortunate is that many people believe almost everything they see on TV, even the ads, and attacks ads are, sadly quite effective. It’s a sorry commentary on our collective intelligence as voters.

It is an article of faith in a democracy like ours that every eligible voter has, not only a right, but a responsibility to vote. I believe that with that right comes the responsibility to learn all they can about the candidates and ballot measures before casting a vote. Casting the vote is the easy part but it’s not enough. Researching the background of the candidates and studying the issues regarding the ballot measures is made relatively easy by the internet, but it does require some effort; effort which too many voters are unwilling to expend. They spend more time shopping for a new smartphone than deciding something really important like who will help run the country. Then they complain about the quality of government they get.

And too many voters choose candidates based on superficial qualities like good looks, youth, speaking ability and charisma rather than experience, past performance and actual qualifications for the office. This turns the election into a popularity or beauty contest. Remember we are not voting for the prom king and queen or Miss Congeniality. We are voting for the person most likely to succeed.

Candidates will usually promise nearly anything to get elected but it is up to the voters to determine if they have what it takes to deliver. The best measurement of future success is past success in positions of great responsibility. It’s easy to promise change but transformational change is hard to achieve and requires leadership and management skills that are not in great abundance. Take their promises with a grain of salt and their campaign literature with several tablespoons.

It’s important to exercise the voting privilege but even more important to be an informed voter. That means thinking for yourself and not falling for the campaign hype. There are plenty of sources on the web to provide you with perspective and different viewpoints. My advice is to recycle the mailers without reading or if you can’t resist reading them, at least consider the source. Mute the TV ads. Their purpose is not to enlighten you; it is to win your vote. By all means, read the candidates’ statements in the newspapers. Follow the debates. Study the voter pamphlets. Weigh the pros and cons. Then judge for yourself and vote.

October 20, 2014

Incompetence in Command

Incompetence in Command.

Incompetence in Command

Incompetence in Command——————————–

                A commentary

                By J. F. Kelly, Jr

 

It seems like nearly every week we read about a Navy commanding officer (CO), executive officer (XO) (second in command) or command master chief (CMC) (senior enlisted person) getting fired or, to use the Navy’s polite term, detached for cause. Sometimes all three, the so-called command triad, get canned as was the case recently in a guided missile destroyer when the current CO, CMC and immediate past XO were axed.

At about the same time, the XO of the guided missile cruiser Cowpens was fired after allegedly driving under the influence. This was the fourth key officer in this ship to be relieved early in three months. The previous CO, CMC and Chief Engineer had also been fired. Another recent CO, Captain Holly Graff, had been relieved earlier for, of all things, cruelty. Even as I write this, I’m listening to a TV report of yet another CO, the skipper of a frigate, fired for alleged sexual misconduct. It’s becoming difficult to keep up.

Space and privacy concerns do not permit a detailed listing here of the firings and the reasons therefore over the past few years, but they are numerous and disturbing. Those interested will find a Google search productive. Suffice it to say there have been far too many and they are a big black eye on the Navy, demoralizing for the crews involved, a waste of the taxpayers’ investment in training and, in my view as a four-time commanding officer and two-time executive officer, indicative of something very wrong with the process of screening for command at sea. What counts in the military are results more than process and the results of the Navy’s process for screening for command at sea clearly is producing too many losers.

Command at sea should be the very pinnacle of a Navy career; the big prize for career Navy unrestricted line officers. In particular, command of a ship demands not just superior leadership and management skills but also character and ethical behavior of the very highest degree because the captain is on duty 24/7 and a role model at all times, ashore as well as on board. Entrusting a ship and a crew to a CO demands that only the very best be chosen, based mostly on demonstrated leadership ability in previous billets at sea.

It isn’t sufficient that an officer simply receive excellent fitness reports to be screened for command. Fitness reports are grossly inflated. Nor is it enough to have served in responsible billets ashore or on the staff of a senior flag officer. Demonstrated ability at sea and experience in all the essential competencies is required to command a ship successfully. These are not skills that are acquired suddenly and there is no substitute for experience at sea.

Command at sea should not be granted as a reward for good and faithful service nor should it be primarily a stepping stone to promotion and positions of higher authority. Command at sea should be considered the capstone of a career, not a preparation for something better like a waypoint one has to pass through on the way to flag rank.

That said, the screening process is indeed already highly selective and competitive but perhaps it is too focused on performance appraisals and not enough on the characteristics and traits of successful commanding officers. In any event, something is obviously wrong with the process. For one thing, the average tour for command at sea is two years. That’s not nearly long enough to maximize experience. If an officer is doing an excellent job in command and loves what he or she is doing, that officer should remain in command longer than two years and should be slated for follow-on commands. Granted, this would reduce command opportunity but it would improve quality and reduce the number of disruptive detachments for cause. Performance trumps command opportunity. Our ships and crews deserve nothing less. The process should focus on building professionalism rather than the current focus on building careers and grooming everyone for possible promotion to flag rank.

Command at sea is too important and demanding to be something that is done once or twice in a Navy career as is presently the case. Our commanding officers spent as much as five years or more ashore between commands if they are lucky enough to get another command. The Navy leadership needs to design a system that identifies officers who are demonstrably good at commanding ships and leave them in command long enough and often enough so that the ships, crews and taxpayers get the full benefit of their experience. If this sounds like a radical concept, or a proposal for a wet and dry Navy, so be it. Something radical needs to be done because the current process is simply producing too many failures.

October 9, 2014