High Levels of Authority and Responsibility Demand Strict Accountability——–
A commentary
By J. F. Kelly, Jr.
The forced early retirement of Vice-Adm. Tom Rowden, as the navy’s Surface Force Commander, following a string of other firings and early retirements after a grounding, two deadly ship collisions and other mishaps in 2017, demonstrates the high level of accountability required of navy commanders. Perhaps an even more vivid example is the announcement that the commanding officers (COs), their officers of the deck (OODs) and other personnel in the USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain, the two guided missile destroyers that collided with merchant ships in congested waters off the Asian coast, will face charges that include negligent homicide, dereliction of duty and hazarding a vessel, charges which carry heavy penalties. While I feel that the charge of negligent homicide is inappropriate, almost impossible to prove and sets a terrible precedent, the other charges seem entirely appropriate and could result in severe punishments.
Adm. Rowden was a highly regarded leader of the surface ship community with a long, distinguished career. His abrupt departure from the post a few days before a scheduled change of command and retirement ceremony must surely seem harsh by civilian standards. But naval commanders responsible for ships and crews are held to higher standards. It was inevitable that after a disastrous year in which 17 sailors died in ship collisions resulting from preventable human error, the surface boss, responsible for training and staffing the ships would be called to account. An investigation headed by Adm. James Caldwell, Chief of Naval Reactors, reportedly recommended that Rowden be relieved.
The COs and OODs of the two destroyers at the time of the collisions and certain other unidentified shipboard personnel will face serious charges which will be the subject of Article 32 investigations which in turn can result in trial by courts-martial. Civilians generally understand the responsibilities that the captain of a ship bears 24 hours a day throughout his or her entire tour in command but some may be less aware of the responsibilities of the OOD. The officer of the deck in a navy ship, like the mate of the watch in a merchant ship, is regarded as the officer in charge of a watch.
The OOD shares the captain’s responsibility for the safety of the ship and crew while on watch as prescribed in Navy Regulations. As the captain’s direct representative on the bridge, he or she is also delegated the captain’s authority while on watch when the captain is absent from the bridge. It is a unique role, unlike anything in civilian life. For the young junior officers who fill this role it is an awesome and challenging responsibility from which they cannot escape while they are on watch. It is clearly not for the faint of heart or the inexperienced. Those officers who are uncomfortable with the role should seek some other line of work or some other way to serve in the navy in the interest of safety at sea.
Because of this shared responsibility, if the captain is relieved as the result of a grounding or collision, the OOD almost invariably suffers a similar fate. We all understood and accepted this when we become qualified to stand OOD watches or command a ship. It may seem like a harsh standard to civilians but such a high level of unquestioned authority and great responsibility simply must be accompanied by strict and unremitting accountability. The safety of our ships and sailors demands nothing less. I always assured each of my crews that when they turned in at night they could sleep soundly, secure in the knowledge that I would never permit an officer to stand watch as OOD that did not have my complete confidence and that I would always be on the bridge whenever the situation called for it.
The ship disasters of 2017 resulted in the firing or early retirement of four flag officers, a ship squadron commander, three commanding offers and their OODs, and other shipboard personnel. It has resulted in a flurry of activity to redesign and re-emphasize training in the basics of ship handling, seamanship, navigation and bridge resources management. This will result in an abundance of caution which will probably add to an already high level of adversity to risk. These actions alone, however, will not be enough to correct the underlying problem which is a lack of sufficient experience on the part of our young OODs and too much variation in how they are trained and certified. Compared to the licensed mariners that run the bridges of merchant ships in today’s congested waterways, they are, in fact, relative amateurs.
Ship driving in the navy has become a part time job, a collateral duty. The navy has lost its mariner culture. Moreover, we are trying to train too many ensigns crowded onto our ships to stand bridge watches, most of whom have no intention of remaining in the surface navy, apparently under the notion that nearly everyone should become surface warfare qualified before moving on to some other specialty. To change this requires a change in a now deeply entrenched culture which still promotes the notion that nearly anyone can be taught to drive a ship with a minimum of training and experience. Replacing leaders with more of the same will not change the culture.
January 26, 2018
(Kelly, a freelance writer based in Coronado, is a retired navy captain who commanded three San Diego-based ships and a naval laboratory. He teaches ship handling, seamanship and navigation at Naval Base, San Diego.)